This paper proposes a simple descriptive model for discrete-time double auction markets of divisible assets. As in the classical models of exchange economics, we consider a finite set of agents described by their initial endowments and preferences. Instead of the classical Walrasian-type market models, however, we assume that all trades take place in double auctions where the agents communicate through sealed limit orders for buying and selling. We find that, in repeated call auctions, nonstrategic bidding leads to a sequence of allocations that converges to individually rational Pareto allocations.
Introduction
Most modern securities exchanges are based on the double auction mechanism where potential buyers and sellers submit limit orders (a market order can be viewed as a limit order with a very generous limit on the price) and the most generous offers are selected for trade by crossing the demand and supply curves. Ever since the pioneering works of Smith [14] , double auctions have been found to lead quickly to efficient allocations but the phenomenon has remained largely unexplained by theory; see e.g. [3] and [13, Section 3] or the collections [15] , [8] and [10] for further evidence and analysis. Section 3 of [7] surveys mathematical models proposed for the analysis of double auctions. This paper studies discrete-time double auctions in the classical set-up of welfare economics with a finite set of agents with given endowments and preferences. We assume that all trades take place in a double auction and that the agents submit limit orders according to their indifference prices. In general, indifference prices depend not only on the agents' preferences but also on their current endowments which change whenever an agent is involved in a trade. We find that, when the double auction is repeated, the allocations converge to a Pareto allocation. Moreover, the speed of convergence is linear in the sense that the total consumer surplus is inversely proportional to the number of iterations. The total surplus of the double auction is zero exactly when the double auction clears with zero trades. As essentially proved already by Debreu [4] (see Section 4 below), the surplus is zero if and only if the current allocation is Pareto efficient. The discovered convergence rate thus explains the efficiency of double auctions observed in empirical studies.
The convergence occurs when the preferences of the agents remain fixed. In practice, the agents' information and preferences and thus, equilibrium prices, change over time. In such a setting, our model would give a structural description of how external factors affect trading and price dynamics. Even with static preferences, all trading in our model occurs out of equilibrium and the trading stops only at equilibrium. The same is true of all markets in practice where disequilibrium is the driving force behind trading; see Fisher [5] for a comprehensive discussion and further analysis of disequilibrium economics.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section starts by reviewing the double auction mechanism as implemented in terms of limit orders in modern securities exchanges. The auction is then formulated in terms the problem of maximizing the consumer surplus. Section 3 presents our model of the market where a finite set of agents is described by their endowments and preferences over different holdings. Section 4 relates double auction equilibria with Pareto allocations. Section 5 proves convergence to Pareto allocations when the double auction is repeated.
Limit orders and double auctions
Consider a double auction market where a finite set I of agents submit limit orders to buy and sell a given asset. A buy-limit order consists of a pricequantity pair (p b i , q b i ) where p b i is the maximum unit price the agent is willing to pay for the asset and q b i is the maximum number of units the agent is willing to buy at this price. Similarly, a sell-limit order (p a i , q a i ) specifies the minimum unit-price and the maximum quantity for selling the asset. Of course, an agent may be only interested in buying or selling. Such agents have q s i = 0 or q b i = 0. The market is cleared by matching the maximum numberx of buy limit orders with sell limit orders, that is,x is the largest number such that s(x) ≤ d(x), where s and d are the supply and demand curves, respectively; see Figure 1 . For each x, the value s(x) is the marginal price when buying a total of x units from the most generous sellers. Mathematically, the supply curve is the nondecreasing function given by
Analogously, the demand curve is the nonincreasing function given by 
where s(x + ) and d(x + ) denote the right limits of s and d, respectively. If either d or s is continuous atx, as in Figure 1 , then the market clearing price is uniquely defined. If the vertical parts of d and s overlap, there is a whole interval of possible market clearing prices. All involved sell orders have limit prices less than or equal to the market clearing price and the involved buy orders have limit prices greater than or equal to the market clearing price. Thus, the agents involved in trading get to trade at a price at least as good as the ones they were willing to accept. The double auction mechanism has a variational formulation that will be useful in further analysis. Indeed, the market clearing condition means thatx is the largest among all x ≥ 0 that maximize the "consumer surplus" D(x) − S(x), where S(x) is the least cost of buying x units from the potential sellers and D(x) is the greatest revenue one could get by selling x units to potential buyers. Mathematically,
Analogously,
The functions S and D can be expressed also as the indefinite integrals of the supply curve and demand curves, s and d, respectively. Conversely, the demand and supply curves d and s can recovered from the functions D and S through the relations
where ∂D(x) is the superdifferential of D at x, i.e. the set of prices p with
Similarly, ∂S(x) is the subdifferential of S atx, i.e. the set of prices p with
We refer the reader to [12, Section 23] for a general study of sub-and superdifferential.
Condition (MCP) can now be written as
This implies that 0 ∈ ∂[D − S](x) which means thatx indeed maximizes the consumer surplus D(x) − S(x) as claimed earlier. Besides this standard formulation, there is another variational formulation of the double auction mechanism that turns out to be useful when studying its efficiency. Indeed, plugging in the definitions of D and S, we can write the surplus maximization problem as
where x + i and x − i denote the purchases and sales, respectively, of agent i. Note that since p b i < p a i , one has either x + i = 0 or x − i = 0. Interpreting negative purchases as sales and extending the definition of D i by
we can write the market clearing problem more concisely as
The functions D i are concave since p b i < p a i . We will call D i the demand function of agent i. It contains exactly the same information as the agents' limit orders.
Submitting several buy and sell orders, an agent can effectively submit any concave function to the exchange. Indeed, if agent i submits collections (p b i,k , q b i,k ) k∈K and (p a i,k , q a i,k ) k∈K of bid and ask limit orders, we obtain the same market clearing problem (P ) but now, agent i's demand function becomes
3 Price-taking agents in multi-asset auctions
Existing double auctions only involve two assets: the asset being auctioned and cash. Our analysis will allow for multiple assets as it turns out that this does not present any complications in theory. It will, however, allow us to make comparisons with classical welfare economics and, in particular, general equilibrium models. The situation with only one traded assets is covered as a special case. We will consider an economy with a finite set J of assets and assume that agent i has initial endowment x 0 i ∈ R J . We assume that the preferences of agent i over different portfolios is measured by a utility function u i on R J . We allow for extended real-valued and nonsmooth u i so they allow for constraints, production and uncertainties. For example, the agents could have "indirect utilities" of the form
where the correspondence Y i describes how an agent can transform a given endowment x i to future outputs y i that may be subject to uncertainties. The objective is to find a "production plan" that maximizes the expected utility as defined by the agent's subjective probability P i and a utility function on the uncertain outputs. Indirect utilities of the above form are often used to describe rational agents in financial economics; see e.g. [1] . Indirect utility functions incorporate agents' information through the subjective probability measures P i which evolve at the arrival of news and other information. Changes in the subjective probabilities would affect the indirect utilities u i and thus, market clearing prices, as we see below.
We will assume nonstrategic bidding in the sense that each agent bids according to their indifference prices (willingness to pay). In other words, the demand function agent i submits to the double auction is given by
where g ∈ R J denotes cash (or any other numeraire asset in terms of which all prices are quoted). The value of D i (x i ) is the greatest amount of cash agent i would be wiling to pay for x i . Paying more would reduce the agent's utility.
Recall that in the single-asset case, the demand function D i is in one-to-one correspondence with the demand curve d i which the agent can communicates to the exchange by means of limit orders. Recall also that negative purchases are interpreted as sales so that S i (x i ) = −D i (−x i ) gives the indifference price for selling x i . Thus, both buyers and sellers can be described by the indifference functions D i . Price-taking behaviour in large economies has been justified under various assumptions. Roberts and Postlewaite [11] assume a general exchange mechanism and show that, possible gains from non-competitive behavior goes to zero as the number of agents increases. Our assumption is akin to that made in Friedman [6] who assumed that the agents neglect strategic feedback effects and bid according to abstract strategies satisfying certain plausibility assumptions. Such assumptions are supported by Cason and Friedman [2] who find that relatively simple bidding rules explain human behavior in double auctions better than more sophisticated strategies. Plott [10, Chapter 10] studies three two-sided auction mechanisms and finds that individuals tend to gain little from strategic bidding.
The following will be assumed throughout.
Assumption 1. The utility functions u i are strictly increasing in g.
The following is a simple consequence of Assumption 1 and the upper semicontinuity of u i ; see e.g. [9, Proposition 2]. Let z ∈ R J and consider the following perturbed market clearing problem
The optimum value can be interpreted as the maximum revenue an auctioneer could get by selling the portfolio z to the market participants. Clearly, when z = 0, we recover the market clearing problem (P ).
Assumption 2.
There is an ε > 0 such that the optimum value of (P z ) is finite for all z ∈ R J with |z| ≤ ε.
The following is a simple application of the classical optimality conditions in convex optimization; see e.g. [12, Section 28]. 
The vector p in Theorem 2 is a market clearing price: agent i will pay p ·x i units of g forx i . At market clearing, the agent's holdings will be updated to
Condition (1) means that
In particular,
where the right hand side equals zero under Assumption 1. Thus, the payment p ·x i is less than what the agent was prepared to pay forx i . Again, if a component x j i of x i is negative, then the agent is selling asset j and receiving −p jx j i units of cash for it. Note that the market clearing condition (2) implies i∈I
so the new allocation is feasible. Under Assumption 1, the double auction never decreases utilities. In other words, the double auction makes a Pareto improvement of allocations. Indeed, we have
The equality would mean that agent i submitted a buy order with limit price equal to the market clearing price.
Recall that the market clearing price need not be unique. The conclusions drawn here do not depend on the choice but, in practice, of course, the choice is important to all agents involved in market clearing. Lemma 3. The condition ∂D i (x i ) p means that p · g = 1 and
Proof. By definition, ∂D i (x i ) p means that
which proves the claim.
Double auction equilibria and Pareto allocations
Any feasible allocation x satisfies
so the optimum value of (P ) may be interpreted as the total consumer surplus generated by the double auction. In order to emphasise its dependence on the current allocation x 0 , we will denote it by CS(x 0 ). Since x = 0 is feasible in (P ), and since D i (0) ≥ 0 under Assumption 1, we have CS(x 0 ) ≥ 0. If CS(x 0 ) = 0, the market clearing problem is solved by x = 0, and we say that x 0 is a double auction equilibrium. 3. there is a price vector p with g · p = 1 and
Proof. The equivalence of the first two follows from Theorem 2 while the equivalence of the last two follows from Lemma 3.
In the terminology of Debreu [4] , Condition 3 in Lemma 4 means that x 0 is a valuation equilibrium with respect to p. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, valuation equilibria thus coincide with double auction equilibria under nonstrategic bidding. Debreu [4] proved that, under reasonable conditions, valuation equilibria coincide with Pareto allocations. With the following lemma, one easily finds that double auction equilibria coincide with Pareto allocations.
Lemma 5. The total surplus equals the optimum value of
(P')
Proof. Using the definition of D i (x i ), we can write problem (P ) as
This is the problem in the statement with r = i∈I r i . Proof. Assume that x 0 is not a double auction equilibrium. By Lemma 5, there is an r > 0 such that the constraints of problem (P') are satisfied. We can then construct another feasible allocation by giving rg to one of the agents. Under Assumption 1, this would lead to strict increase of the agent's utility so x 0 can't be Pareto.
On the other hand, if x 0 is not Pareto, there is a feasible allocationx such that
we would then obtain a feasible solution with strictly positive optimum value. Thus, x 0 would not be a double auction equilibrium. The two implications in Theorem 6 were proved in Debreu [4] under slightly different assumptions. The seemingly more involved separation argument used in [4] is replaced here by Theorem 2, the proof of which also relies on separation.
Assumption 3 clearly holds if there is an
x i ∈ dom u i such that set {x i ∈ R J | u i (x i ) > u i (x i )} is open, or if the effective domain dom u i := {x i ∈ R J | u i (x i ) > −∞}
Convergence to efficient allocations
In general, an agent's demand function D i depends on her endowment x 0 i . After market clearing, her endowment is changed to x 1 i = x 0 i +x 0 i − (p ·x 0 i )g so her demand may change too. There is no reason for the new allocation x 1 to be a double auction equilibrium, in general.
Assume now that the auction is repeated indefinitely and denote agent i's position after the tth auction by x t i . That is,
where p t is the market clearing price andx t i is agent i's purchase in the tth auction. Under fairly general conditions, the surplus decreases to zero if the auction is repeated indefinitely. The following is a slight strengthening of Assumption 1.
Assumption 4. For every r > 0 there exists a δ i > 0 such that
Assumption 4 is implied by Assumption 1 if u i is finite everywhere, or more generally, if x i + rg ∈ int dom u i for all x i ∈ cl dom u i and r > 0. Concavity of u i implies that the difference quotient
r is nonincreasing in r so the inequality in Assumption 4 implies
An allocationx said to be individually rational if u i (x i ) ≥ u i (x 0 i ). Theorem 7. Assume that the sequence (x t ) is bounded and that Assumption 4 holds. Then CS(x t ) decreases with t,
and the cluster pointsx of (x t ) ∞ t=0 are double auction equilibria and individually rational. In particular,x are Pareto efficient under Assumption 3.
Proof. By Lemma 5, the total surplus CS(x t−1 ) of the tth auction is the optimum value of
Making the change of variables z i = x t−1 i + w i , we can write this as
where i∈I
is nondecreasing in t for all i ∈ I, the constraints become more restrictive with t so the optimum value CS(x t ) is nonincreasing.
Denote agent i's surplus in the tth auction by
and let α > 0 be such that CS i (x t ) ≤ α and x t i ∈ B(α) for all t. Writing
gives
Adding up over iterations s = 1, . . . , t gives
and adding up over agents
Since CS(x t ) is nonincreasing in t, the left side is greater than tCS(x t ) so
which proves the second claim.
Ifx is a cluster point of (x t ), the upper semicontinuity of u i and the monotonicity of u i (x t i ) in t give
Thus, by Lemma 5, CS(x) ≤ CS(x t ) for all t so CS(x) = 0.
Theorem 7 restates the fundamental fact of welfare economics that competitive markets lead to efficient allocations. While the classical Walrasian model of the market leads to an equilibrium in a single trade, it assumes that the equilibrium prices are given exogenously or through a tatonnement process which is at odds with existing market mechanisms. Our market model gives a more realistic description of markets where prices are formed endogenously and the market clearing needs to be iterated in order to reach equilibrium. Moreover, our result gives a worst-case bound on the speed of convergence which has been observed in extensive empirical studies ever since the pioneering works of Smith [14] .
The assumption of boundedness of the sequence of allocations seems rather reasonable from the practical perspective. Nevertheless, the following gives a more concrete condition on the utilities that guarantees the boundedness.
Remark 8. A sequence generated by repeated auctions is bounded if
where u ∞ i is the recession function of u i defined by
for somex i ∈ dom u i (the definition is independent ofx i ∈ dom u i ); see [12, Theorem 8.5] . The condition holds, in particular, if u ∞ i (x i ) < 0 for x i / ∈ R J − . This holds e.g. for the Cobb-Douglas utilities.
